Introduction
In this study we investigate the impact of mutual fund ownership on stock price informativeness based on a large sample of Chinese listed firms. Roll (1988) suggest that the proportion of variations in stock price which is not explained by market-wide information captures firm-specific information available to investors in the stock market. Morck et al. (2000) document that China has one of the lowest stock price informativeness among the 40 countries in their analyses. They attribute this to weak investor protection institutional environment in China. Gul et al. (2010) and Hou et al. (2012) provide evidence that stock price informativeness in China is especially low among listed firms under state control. They attribute this to inefficient corporate governance among firms that are supported by the state. Low stock price informativeness implies weak corporate information environment, which reduces the ability of outside investors in the capital market to forecast firm performance and formulate valuation decisions. This in turn reduces investors' confidence and the ability of the capital market to efficiently allocate financial resources to fund firms with growth opportunities. As China strives to become one of the largest economies in the world, the function of the stock market in supplying capital to firms will become increasingly important. Thus, the improvement of corporate information environment is an important issue to China's further development and has implications to other emerging economies.
Our focus on the effect of mutual fund ownership in improving corporate information environment in China is motivated by two strands of literature. First, previous studies highlight the important role of mutual funds in mitigating the agency problem and promoting better governance (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Smith, 1996; Tirole, 2001 ). For example, Chou et al. (2011) show that mutual fund ownership is positively associated with quality governance because they intentionally invest in well-governed firms and they remain active in monitoring firms they invest. Ng et al. (2009) use past firm performance as an indicator of managerial effectiveness and report that mutual fund exhibits weaker support for management proposal in under-performing firms. They conclude that the finding is consistent with mutual fund playing a monitoring role, as mutual funds attach importance to firm's prior performance when casting proxy votes. Second, previous studies also highlight the association between corporate governance and corporate information environment. Information asymmetry resulting from the separation of ownership and control can be prominent because managers have the incentive to withhold information in order to benefit themselves (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . Existing studies indicate that improvements in internal or external governance mechanisms can constrain manager's self-serving behavior and pressure managers to disclose high quality information, which can, in turn, lead to improved corporate information environment (Armstrong et al., 2012; Beasley, 1996; Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010; Hou et al., 2012; Kelton and Yang, 2008; Klein, 2002) . Based on the aforementioned literature, we expect mutual fund ownership to strengthen the corporate governance of Chinese listed firms and exert positive influence on the stock price informativeness of Chinese listed firms. This is the first research question we seek to examine empirically.
In 2000, Chinese government made a strategic decision to spur the development of mutual fund industry, as mutual funds were expected to play a central role in enhancing corporate governance in listed companies and balancing the rampant speculation by individual investors (CSRC, 2000) . The mutual fund industry in China witnessed rapid growth in the first decade of the 21 st century. The number of fund management companies (mutual fund) has increased from 6
(5) in 1998 to 57 (323) in 2006, and the total net asset under management increased from RMB 469 billion in 2005 to RMB 1796.9 billion in 2007 (Firth et al., 2010; Yuan et al., 2008) . 1 However, whether the development of mutual funds improved the governance of Chinese listed
firm remains an open question, as prior studies provide mixed evidences. For example, Yuan et al. (2008) report a positive association between mutual fund ownership and firm performance. In contrast, Firth et al. (2010) focus on the Split Share Structure Reform and find that mutual fund ownership is negatively related to the compensation given to tradable shareholders, indicating that mutual fund may not necessarily protect the interest of minority shareholders. 2 We expect the external governance role of mutual funds in China to be moderated by state ownership of listed firms. This is because state support reduces the dependence of Chinese listed firms on capital market for external funding, which in turn reduces the ability of mutual funds to influence and pressure firms. In other words, we expect the positive relationship between mutual fund ownership and stock price informativeness to be less pronounced among firms with higher state ownership. This is the second research question we seek to examine through empirical analyses.
To test our two aforementioned research questions, we construct stock price informativeness measures following Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) for all the firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the period between 2003 and 2008. We conduct a multivariate regression analysis incorporating mutual fund ownership, firm characteristics and fundamental corporate governance variables. Consistent with our expectation, we show that mutual fund ownership (as a ratio to either total shares or freely-traded shares) has a positive 1 Similarly, the considerable growth in the mutual funds industry was also observed in many markets such the US, Greece, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Ireland (Klapper et al., 2004) . 2 We suggest that the findings of Firth et al. (2010) should be interpreted with caution, because during the "split share structure reform" CSRC (the Chinese counterpart of SEC) transferred the voting rights from individual fund managers to the investment decision committee of the fund management companies, against which CSRC may impose strong political pressure to refrain funds from bargaining a more favorable compensation plan. This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the hypotheses development;
Section 3 discusses the methodology adopted in the empirical investigation, the sample selected and the summary statistics of the variables; and finally, our empirical findings are presented in Sections 4. Section 5 concludes.
Literature and hypotheses

Mutual funds and corporate governance
To date, existing studies have increasingly focused on the role of institutional investors in monitoring or influencing corporate managers. This can result from the fact that they are more willing to exert pressure on managers to make decisions in favor of boosting shareholders' wealth, while simultaneously increasing the percentage of their shareholding in firms. Due to the highly concentrated holdings of institutional investors, their monitoring can be more cost effective. Therefore, in the extant studies, there is a consensus that agency problems pertaining to corporate governance can be mitigated by the involvement of institutional investors in the ownership of a firm, since proxy voting has been considered as one of the most cost-effective channels for monitoring activities. In some studies, aggregate institutional holdings was employed as a proxy for corporate monitoring strength (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Gordon and Pound, 1993; Morgan and Poulsen, 2001 ). Cornett et al. (2007) provide evidence that both an increase in the number of institutional stockholders and their increased ownership percentage can improve firms' operating performance.
More specifically, the rationale for the role of institutional investors or mutual funds as corporate monitors is that, compared with individual investors, mutual funds or institutional investors present a dramatically larger incentive to monitor managers. This would prompt managers to be more concerned about firms' performance and shareholders, and thus discourage them from opportunism (Cornett et al., 2007; Grossman and Hart, 1980; Mayer, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . In particular, among institutional or block stakeholders, Pound (1988) indicates that mutual funds can plan an direct role in corporate monitoring because of their investment expertise in addition to their large shareholding.
Voting is recognized as the most direct and cost-effective channel through which mutual funds can pressure corporate managers into taking account of shareholders' interests in Duan and Jiao (2011) find that mutual funds are more likely to vote against management when management recommendations on proposals conflict with those of independent proxy advisory firm (Institute Shareholder Services), which is consistent with mutual fund playing an active role in monitoring manager's behavior.
The evidence provided by Davis and Kim (2007) suggest that voting decisions have an impact on the quality of corporate governance in their targeted firms. In particular, the quality of corporate governance of a firm can be further strengthened by mutual fund investment, since their supportive voting can act as an essential determinant of a proposal's passage, as well as of the board implementing such proposals (Ertimur et al., 2010; Thomas and Cotter, 2007 Dechow et al. (1996) show that firms with CEO duality, fewer outside block holders, or boards of directors dominated by management are more likely to attempt to manipulate earnings. This is in support of Beasley's (1996) findings regarding the relationship between corporate governance and financial statement fraud. Greater independence of the board or audit committee can reduce abnormal accruals, and this effect is more prominent if there is a minority of outside directors on the board or audit committee (Klein, 2002) . A similar inference is also drawn by Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) for Greek companies. Ajinkya et al. (2005) indicate that management earnings forecasts issued by firms with a higher proportion of outside directors or institutional ownership tend to be more reliable. Evidence in support of the positive relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate transparency is also provided by Kelton and Yang (2008) , who adopted Internet financial reporting as the infomativeness measure.
Corporate policy or regulation may also have an impact on corporate transparency, as Stefanescu (2011) claims that the level of corporate informativeness is determined by corporate governance requirements under the Common Law regime. For instance, Armstrong et al. (2012) show that the passage of state anti-takeover laws in the US market can simultaneously improve information asymmetry, private information gathering and financial statement informativeness.
The unique Split Share Structure Reform in the Chinese stock market is found to effectively increase share price informativeness through the increase in the proportion of freely tradable shares, and this improvement is more pronounced for firms with greater state control (Hou et al., 2012 ).
More supportive findings are documented for the Chinese market. Due to the dominant entrenchment effect, Ding et al. (2007) show that Chinese state-owned firms manifest a higher level of earnings management and consequently weakened minority shareholder protection.
Moreover, they find that ownership concentration displays an inverted U shape relationship with earnings management. By examining the association between stock returns and earnings in the Chinese market, Firth et al. (2007) indicate that firms with a higher proportion of foreign shareholders and tradable shares tend to have higher levels of earnings informativeness, while the reverse effect can be found for those with a highly concentrated ownership. Greater ownership concentration can weaken corporate transparency for Chinese listed firms, while both auditor quality and foreign ownership show a positive association with corporate transparency (Gul et al., 2010) .
Hypotheses development
Based on the discussion in previous sections, we suggest that mutual fund ownership can have a positive impact on stock price informativeness through the following channels. First, high mutual fund ownership may play an active role in strengthening corporate governance and disciplining managers to disclose high quality information, which results in improved corporate information environment. Better information environment helps to mitigate information asymmetry and reduce the monitoring cost against agency problems. Empirically, Velury and Jenkins (2006) find that the quality of reported earnings is positively associated with institutional ownership. Similarly, Chung et al. (2002) , Koh (2003), and Hadani et al. (2011) However, this improvement in the firm's information environment could be mitigated by the dominant state ownership in Chinese listed firms. There are two possible reasons for this.
First, firms with higher state ownership receive greater financial support from government, which in turn reduces their dependence on stock market for external capital (e.g. Chen et al. (2011) ). Among firms with less reliance on stock market for financing, the ability of mutual fund to influence and discipline managers against opportunistic behavior is reduced. Second, the significant concentration of state shareholders leads to an entrenchment effect, since both controlling shareholders and managers with a substantial amount of ownership have greater incentives to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2000; Mcconnell and Servaes, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Stulz, 1988) . Concentrated state ownership can result in information being withheld, less protection for minority shareholders, as well as lower corporate performance and a reduction in firms' value, because these shareholders are more interested in pursuing their own political ambitions and prospects rather than looking after the interests of other shareholders or maximizing the value of the firm. Existing evidence suggest that there is limited relationship between share prices and executive pay in state-owned firms (Firth et al., 2006; Wei and Xiao, 2006) . Based on the discussion, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis H2: The positive impact of mutual fund ownership on stock price informativeness among Chinese listed firms is moderated by state ownership.
3. Methodology and sample
Measure of stock informativeness
Our principal measure of price informativeness is proposed by Roll (1988) . Theoretically speaking, the stock price of a firm is less likely to convey firm-specific information and thus less informative if the stock returns of a firm is strongly correlated with market return. 5 We estimate stock price informativeness using firm-specific regressions of weekly excess returns on market excess returns as follows. As previous research (i.e. Ding and Cheng, 2011) suggests that US market leads the movement of Chinese market, in equation (1) we account for the systematic stock return of the US market. In equation (2) we only consider the systematic stock return of the Chinese stock market.
( 1) ( 2) where RET it is the weekly excess return of individual stocks in China; CNMKETRET t is the weekly excess return of the Shanghai Composite Index; USMKETRET t is the weekly excess return of the US stock markets, which is calculated as the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates). We use the 7-day China interbank offered rate as a proxy for the risk free return in China and we use the one-month Treasury bill rate as the risk free return in the US. Following Fernandes and Fereira's (2008) , we use a logistic transformation of as follows: (3) where is the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to total volatility for firm i and is obtained from the firm-specific weekly return regression. We denote the stock price informativeness measure as and respectively for the calculated based on the of Equations (1) and (2). Using the market model, we can decompose total stock return variations into two components. One is the stock return variation relates to the market wide factors, and the other is associated with firm specific factors. As a consequence, we define the share price informativeness measures as the fraction of firm-specific return variation to the market-wide variation. Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) indicate that some firms may be more sensitive to market-wide or economy-wide shocks and thus both firmspecific and market wide return variations are scaled by the total stock return variation. Therefore, we have and in Equation (3).
Test of hypothesis
To test our hypotheses H1 and H2, we use the measure of share price informativeness developed in section 3.1 as the dependent variable and regress it on the variable of fund-holding percentage and a set of control variables. Following prior studies such as Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) and Cornett et al. (2007) , we use the lead-lag approach to test how the fund ownership level at year t affects the stock informativeness at year t+1 as follows:
where Ψ i,t+1 is a measure of share price informativeness derived from time-series regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on stock market weekly excess returns for firm i in year t (i.e.
it is calculated using weekly excess return from January to December each year, and thus yearly informativeness proxy is constructed). We use and specified in Section 3.1 above as dependent variables for the main tests and additional tests respectively. We define Fund as the ratio of fund ownership to the number of freely-traded shares. SOR is defined as the ratio of state shares relative to the total shares of the listed firm. SOE is a dummy variable which is set to 1 for state-owned enterprises and 0 otherwise.
We first introduce a set of control variables including firm characteristics. These variables have been shown in the literature to have an impact on the level of firm transparency. SIZE captures firm size and is defined as the natural log of market capitalization. PB captures growth and is measured as market-to-book value. LEV captures leverage and is measured as the debt-tototal asset ratio. IROA captures profitability and is the industry median adjusted return on assets, measured as operating income divided by total assets. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. ST is a dummy variable indicating loss firms and is equal to 1 if firms experience two consecutive years of loss at year t and t-1 (and therefore labeled as "Special Treatment" by the stock exchange) and 0 otherwise. 6 SSSR is a dummy variable indicating Split Share Structure
Reform and is equal to 1 if the firm has completed the reform compensation negotiation process and 0 otherwise. FOR foreign ownership defined as the ratio of foreign shares relative to total shares.
We also include a number of corporate governance variables to test the marginal/incremental impact of mutual funds on corporate transparency. To capture the impact of the quality of external auditing, Big4 is auditor quality indicator and is equal to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms (PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young or KPMG) and 0 otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration measured by the Herfindahl index of the ownership from the 10 largest shareholders. DCEOH is CEO stock ownership and is set to 1 if the ratio of shares held by the CEO is below 25% or above 75% of the cross-sectional annual observation, which may induce entrenchment. Duality is 1 for firms with a CEO who also serves as chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. Dmeet is board activeness and equal to 1 if the meeting frequency of the firm is equal to or above the median value of cross-sectional annual observation, and 0 otherwise. Dbsize is equal to 1 if the number of board members is equal to or above the median value of cross-sectional annual observation, and 0 otherwise. Dind is board independence and is equal to 1 if the ratio of independent directors is equal to or above the median value of cross-sectional annual observation, and 0 otherwise. Dssize is equal to 1 if the number of the supervisory board members is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation, and 0 otherwise. These independent variables are given at fiscal year-end report.
In Equation (4), the relationship between mutual fund ownership and share price informativeness can be evaluated by α 1 , which is the coefficient on Fund. Based on Hypothesis H1, we can expect α 1 to have a significantly positive value if the share-holding of mutual funds
can improve the quality of corporate governance in their portfolio firms, and if share price informativeness can be improved by higher quality corporate governance. According to Hypothesis 2, we expect a significant and negative coefficient α 3 on the interaction term Fund×SOR, which indicates the incremental relationship between the level of share price informativeness and the interaction between mutual fund ownership and the sensitivity of the abolition of restricted shares. In other words, a negative α 3 implies that a higher proportion of state shares in a firm will moderate the positive relationship between mutual fund and share price informativeness.
To enhance the rigor and robustness of our evidence, we also implement different sets of additional tests using alternative measures of state ownership, mutual fund ownership, and stock price informativeness. We substitute SOR with the alternative variable RSR, which is measured as number of restricted shares to total shares, and SOE, which is equal to 1 for state-controlled firms and 0 otherwise. We substitute Fund with the alternative variable Fundt measured as the ratio of fund ownership to the number of total shares. We substitute with specified in Section 3.1 above as dependent variable. Finally, we also further classify mutual funds into
closed end and open end funds to determine whether these two groups differ in effect.
Data and sample statistics
The data used in our study are mainly taken from CSMAR ( and ψ2, have similar means and medians. We expect to observe a lower average for ψ1 than ψ2
as the former has taken into account the impact of the US market while the latter has only accounted for the domestic Chinese market information. These imply that the incorporation of the US market returns does not explain a large proportion of the return variation in the Chinese market. Also, the value of the means is close to and slightly larger than their medians, indicating that the distribution is nearly symmetrical. Chinese firms using the big 4 auditing companies, equivalent to 7.06%. Finally, it is of interest that the average level of CEO duality is only 1%.
[Insert Table 1 here]
From Table 2 , it can be seen that the correlation coefficient between the two informativeness measures is up to 0.8976. This confirms the interpretation from Table 1 that a very small proportion of Chinese stock return innovation is contributed by the US market information and provides the explanation that results are robust when these two measures are adopted alternatively. We also observe a negative relationship between the two share price informativeness measures and state ownership, restricted share percentage and the statecontrolled enterprises dummy variable. This is consistent with firms under state control having lower corporate disclosure incentives since they are less dependent on capital market for funding.
In general, most of the correlations reported in Table 2 are below 0.2 and thus present no concerns about multicollinearity among the explanatory variables.
[Insert Table 2 here]
4 Empirical results [Insert Table 3 here]
Main tests of hypotheses
This positive coefficient on Fund in our regression analyses in Table 3 is different from the results in the correlation matrix of Table 2 , which shows a negative relationship between fund ownership and share price informativeness measures. This may result from the fact that bivariate correlation analysis cannot control possible confounding factors which we control in multivariate regression analyses. However, our results in Table 3 are consistent even when we include one control variable only. We also test the sum of the coefficients SOR and the interaction term (Fund×SOR) for Regressions 3 and 5 in Table 3 , and we obtain the coefficient as -0.523 (t-stat = -1.86) and -0.7017 (t-stat = -2.48), which further shows that the state ownership has significant negative impact on the stock informativeness. Turning to the control variables, Table 3 suggest that stock price informativeness is lower among larger, more profitable, and higher trading volume firms, which is probably due to greater influence of such firms to the movement of market portfolio returns. Firms that are more levered also have lower stock price informativeness possibly because such firms have greater dependence on debt capital and therefore have less incentive to communicate with equity investors. Firms with larger supervisor board have higher price informativeness, and this implies that internal governance plays a role in corporate transparency. Finally, in the untabulated robustness checks, we also adjust for firm clustering effect in our analyses and obtain results with consistent inference to our main findings.
Robustness checks
In Tables 4 to 7 , we present analyses where we apply alternative state ownership, fund ownership, and stock price informativeness measures. The overall purpose is to ensure that our main findings are not specific to the way we compute these measures in Table 3 . In Table 4 Table 2 , this is also consistent with our main results.
[Insert Table 4 here]
In Table 5 we substitute state ownership ratio (SOR) with state-owned enterprise dummy variable (SOE). This alternative measure captures whether state shareholders are the controlling shareholder. Controlling shareholder have more influence on firm decision making and firms dominated by state shareholders are expected to be less dependent on capital market, which reduces incentives to communicate with outside investors. In Table 5 we also scale the fund ownership measure by total number of shares (Fundt) instead. The fund ownership measure we applied in Table 3 is scaled by the number of freely tradable shares. The alternative measure we use incorporates restricted shares mainly held by state shareholders. In other words, the differences between these two measures are likely to be greater in firms with higher restricted shares. Across Table 5 , the coefficient pertaining to Fundt is significantly positive while that of the interaction term FundSOE is significantly negative. This suggests that firms with higher institutional investor ownership relative to total share ownership improves transparency of firms that have are not controlled by state shareholders.
[Insert Table 5 here] Table 6 substitutes the dependent variable with alternative stock price informativeness measure estimated only using Chinese stock market portfolio returns. The objective is to evaluate if our main findings in Table 3 is sensitive to the exclusion of US stock market portfolio returns from our estimation of stock price informativeness. In this set of analyses, we apply mutual fund ownership scaled by the number of freely tradable shares (Fund) and state controlled listed firm dummy variable (SOE). In both Regressions 1 and 2, we observe that the coefficient on Fund is significantly positive and the coefficient on FundSOE is also significantly negative, which is similar to our main findings.
[Insert Table 6 here] [Insert Table 7 here]
Conclusion
We predict and find evidence that mutual fund ownership increases stock price informativeness in China. We argue that the underlying mechanism of this influence is as follows. Institutional investors have more expertise and incentives to monitor firm than individual investors. As such, institutional investors can serve an external corporate governance role to reduce agency problem that arise from the separation of ownership and control. When managers have less incentive to expropriate shareholders or behave opportunistically, firms are less likely to withhold information and/or window dress their performance. As a result, the quality and quantity of firm-specific information released to outside investors are expected to improve as corporate governance improves. As a result, investors are able to formulate valuation decisions based on firm-specific instead of market-wide information. In other words, the stock return variations of firms are less likely to be attributed to systematic market-wide variations.
Thus, this is reflected in the greater stock price informativeness that we measure.
We also predict and find that state ownership moderates the positive influence of mutual fund ownership on stock price informativeness in China. We argue that the underlying rationale of this effect is as follows. Firms with higher state ownership in China receive government financial support. Such firms have less dependence on stock market for external capital to fund their investment projects. When firms are less reliant on stock market for funding, there is less need for them to communicate with investors in order to reduce information uncertainty and decrease cost of equity capital. Among firms with greater state ownership and control, the ability of institutional investors to monitor and influence is also likely to reduce since managers in such firms answer more to the state than to the stock market.
The main policy implication from our study is that institutional investors should be further encouraged in weak investor protection environments that are common in emerging economies such as China. However, at the same time, in order to further realize the benefit of institutional investors as external governance mechanism, it is necessarily to expand the process of privatization. 2 ) is share price informativeness measure derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese and US (Chinese) stock market weekly excess returns. Fund (Fundt) denotes the ratio of fund ownership to the number of freelytraded shares (total shares). SOR (RSR) is with the ratio of state shares (restricted shares) relative to the total shares of the listed firm. SOE is equal to 1 for state-owned enterprises and 0 otherwise. SIZE is natural log of market capitalization. PB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. ST is equal to 1 if the firms experience two-year consecutive loss (therefore specially treated by the stock exchange) and 0 otherwise. SSSR is equal to 1 if the firm has finished the Split Share Structure Reform i.e. the consideration scheme has been voted through and 0 otherwise. FOR is the ratio of foreign shares relative to total shares. Big4 is set to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms (PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young or KPMG). OwnCon is the Herfindahl index of the ownership from the 10 largest shareholders. DCEOH is set to be 1 if shares held by CEO holding ratio is below the 25% or above the 75% of the cross-sectional annual observation. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. Dmeet is equal to 1 if the meeting frequency of the firm is above or equal to the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dbsize is set to 1 if the number of directors on the board is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dind is equal to 1 if the ratio of independent directors is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dssize is set to 1 if the number of supervisory board members is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese and US (Chinese) stock market weekly excess returns. Fund (Fundt) denotes the ratio of fund ownership to the number of freely-traded shares (total shares). SOR (RSR) is with the ratio of state shares (restricted shares) relative to the total shares of the listed firm. SOE is equal to 1 for state-owned enterprises and 0 otherwise. SIZE is natural log of market capitalization. PB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. ST is equal to 1 if the firms experience two-year consecutive loss (therefore specially treated by the stock exchange) and 0 otherwise. SSSR is equal to 1 if the firm has finished the Split Share Structure Reform i.e. the consideration scheme has been voted through and 0 otherwise. FOR is the ratio of foreign shares relative to total shares. Big4 is set to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms (PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young or KPMG). OwnCon is the Herfindahl index of the ownership from the 10 largest shareholders. DCEOH is set to be 1 if shares held by CEO holding ratio is below the 25% or above the 75% of the cross-sectional annual observation. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. Dmeet is equal to 1 if the meeting frequency of the firm is above or equal to the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dbsize is set to 1 if the number of directors on the board is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dind is equal to 1 if the ratio of independent directors is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dssize is set to 1 if the number of supervisory board members is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. 
The dependent variable Ψ 1 is share price informativeness measure derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese and US stock market weekly excess returns. Fund denotes the ratio of fund ownership relative to the number of freely-traded shares. SOR denotes the ratio of state ownership relative to total number of shares of the firm. SIZE is natural log of market capitalization. PB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. ST is equal to 1 if the firms experience two-year consecutive loss (therefore specially treated by the stock exchange) and 0 otherwise. SSSR is equal to 1 if the firm has finished the Split Share Structure Reform i.e. the consideration scheme has been voted through and 0 otherwise. FOR is the ratio of foreign shares relative to total shares. Big4 is set to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms (PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young or KPMG) . OwnCon is the Herfindahl index of the ownership from the 10 largest shareholders. DCEOH is set to be 1 if shares held by CEO holding ratio is below the 25% or above the 75% of the cross-sectional annual observation. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. Dmeet is equal to 1 if the meeting frequency of the firm is above or equal to the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dbsize is set to 1 if the number of directors on the board is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dind is equal to 1 if the ratio of independent directors is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dssize is set to 1 if the number of supervisory board members is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. The sample period covers 2003 to 2008. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
The dependent variable Ψ 1 is share price informativeness measure derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese and US stock market weekly excess returns. RSR denotes the ratio of restricted shares relative to total shares of the firm. SIZE is natural log of market capitalization. PB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. ST is equal to 1 if the firms experience two-year consecutive loss (therefore specially treated by the stock exchange) and 0 otherwise. SSSR is equal to 1 if the firm has finished the Split Share Structure Reform i.e. the consideration scheme has been voted through and 0 otherwise. FOR is the ratio of foreign shares relative to total shares. Big4 is set to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms (PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young or KPMG) . OwnCon is the Herfindahl index of the ownership from the 10 largest shareholders. DCEOH is set to be 1 if shares held by CEO holding ratio is below the 25% or above the 75% of the cross-sectional annual observation. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. Dmeet is equal to 1 if the meeting frequency of the firm is above or equal to the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dbsize is set to 1 if the number of directors on the board is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dind is equal to 1 if the ratio of independent directors is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dssize is set to 1 if the number of supervisory board members is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. The sample period covers 2003 to 2008. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
The dependent variable Ψ 1 is share price informativeness measure derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese and US stock market weekly excess returns. SOE is equal to 1 if the firm is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and 0 otherwise. Fundt is the ratio of fund ownership relative to the total number of shares. SIZE is natural log of market capitalization. PB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. ST is equal to 1 if the firms experience two-year consecutive loss (therefore specially treated by the stock exchange) and 0 otherwise. SSSR is equal to 1 if the firm has finished the Split Share Structure Reform i.e. the consideration scheme has been voted through and 0 otherwise. FOR is the ratio of foreign shares relative to total shares. Big4 is set to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms (PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young or KPMG). OwnCon is the Herfindahl index of the ownership from the 10 largest shareholders. DCEOH is set to be 1 if shares held by CEO holding ratio is below the 25% or above the 75% of the cross-sectional annual observation. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. Dmeet is equal to 1 if the meeting frequency of the firm is above or equal to the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dbsize is set to 1 if the number of directors on the board is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dind is equal to 1 if the ratio of independent directors is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dssize is set to 1 if the number of supervisory board members is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. The sample period covers 2003 to 2008. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
The dependent variable 2  denotes share price informativeness measure derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on Chinese market weekly excess returns. Fund denotes the ratio of fund ownership relative to the number of freely-traded shares. SOE is equal to 1 if the firm is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and 0 otherwise. SIZE is natural log of market capitalization. PB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. ST is equal to 1 if the firms experience two-year consecutive loss (therefore specially treated by the stock exchange) and 0 otherwise. SSSR is equal to 1 if the firm has finished the Split Share Structure Reform i.e. the consideration scheme has been voted through and 0 otherwise. FOR is the ratio of foreign shares relative to total shares. Big4 is set to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms (PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young or KPMG). OwnCon is the Herfindahl index of the ownership from the 10 largest shareholders. DCEOH is set to be 1 if shares held by CEO holding ratio is below the 25% or above the 75% of the cross-sectional annual observation. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. Dmeet is equal to 1 if the meeting frequency of the firm is above or equal to the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dbsize is set to 1 if the number of directors on the board is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dind is equal to 1 if the ratio of independent directors is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dssize is set to 1 if the number of supervisory board members is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. The sample period covers 2003 to 2008. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. . Share price informativeness measure derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese and US stock market weekly excess returns for firm i in year t (i.e. it is calculated using weekly excess return from January to December each year, and thus yearly informativeness proxy is constructed). Share price informativeness measure derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on Chinese stock market weekly excess returns. Fund (Fundt) Ratio of fund ownership to the number of freely-traded shares (total shares) SOR Ratio of state shares relative to the total shares of the listed firm RSR Ratio of restricted shares relative to the total shares of the listed firm SOE Dummy variable set to 1 for state-owned enterprises and 0 otherwise.
Control Variables:
Size The natural logarithm of market capitalization PB Price-to-book ratio Lev Debt-to-total asset ratio IROA Industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset Vol Trading volume measured as turnover ST Dummy variable indicating loss firms and is equal to 1 if firms experience two consecutive years of loss at year t and t-1 (and therefore labeled as "Special Treatment" by the stock exchange) and 0 otherwise.
SSSR
Dummy variable set to 1 if the firm has finished the Split Share Structure Reform requirement For Number of foreign shares relative to the total number of shares OwnCon
The Herfindahl index of the top 10 largest blockholders of the firm Big4
Dummy variable assigned to 1 if the audit firm is one of the big 4 (i.e. PwC, Deloittee, Ernst & Young, and KPMG); and 0 otherwise DCEOH Dummy variable set to be 1 if shares held by CEO holding ratio is below the 25% or above the 75% of the cross-sectional annual observation which may induce entrenchment Duality Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO also holds the position of board chair; and 0 otherwise Dmeet Dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of board meetings is equal to or above the median value of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise Dbsize Dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of board members is equal to or above the median value of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise Drind Dummy variable equal to 1 if the ratio of independent directors is equal to or above the median value of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise Dssize Dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of supervisory board members is equal to or above the median value of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise Industry and region dummies are definition:
The industry dummies are constructed based on the first two digits of the GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) codes. The region dummies are constructed by following Frith et al. (2006) , in which the firms are grouped into four different regions by the levels of economic development: 1. Shanghai and Shenzhen; 2. The more developed areas including the open cities and provinces along the coast; 3. The inland provinces; and 4. The least developed area in the north-western part of the country.
